Resources and Further Reading

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Chapter 1: Introduction to Utilitarianism

Resources for Introduction to Utilitarianism:

Introduction

- Utilitarianism: Crash Course Philosophy #36
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). *Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Krister Bykvist (2010). *Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed*. London: Continuum.
- Kwame Anthony Appiah. What is Utiiltarianism?, Royal Institute of Philosophy *15-Minute Masterclass*.

The Classics

- Jeremy Bentham (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
- John Stuart Mill (1863). Utilitarianism.
- Henry Sidgwick (1874). The Methods of Ethics.

Further Reading

- Julia Driver (2014). The History of Utilitarianism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Bart Schultz (2017). *The Happiness Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- James Crimmins (2017). *The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism*. Bloomsbury.
- Derek Parfit (2017). *On What Matters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yew-Kwang Ng (1990). Welfarism and Utilitarianism: A Rehabilitation. *Utilitas*. 2(2): 171–193.

Chapter 2: Elements and Types of Utilitarianism

Resources for Elements and Types of Utilitarianism:

Consequentialism

- Julia Driver (2011). *Consequentialism, New Problems of Philosophy*. José Luis Bermúdez (ed.). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Samuel Scheffler (1994). *The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2015). Consequentialism. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Welfarism & Theories of Well-Being

- Roger Crisp (2017). Well-Being. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. *Utilitas*. 15(2): 151–174.
- Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.

Impartiality

- Robert Goodin (1988). What is so special about our fellow countrymen? *Ethics*, 98 (4): 663-686.
- Troy Jollimore (2018). Impartiality. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Aggregationism

- John Broome (1991). *Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time*. London: Wiley-Blackwell. Chapters 4 and 10.

- Krister Bykvist (2010). *Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed*. London: Continuum. Chapter 5: Utilitarian Aggregation.
- Alastair Norcross (1997). Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. 26(2): 135–167.

Hedonism

- Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 73(3): 619–645.
- Fred Feldman (2004). *Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism*. Oxford University Press.
- Shelly Kagan (1992).The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.
- Ole Martin Moen (2016). An Argument for Hedonism. *The Journal of Value Inquiry*. 50: 267–281.
- Andrew Moore (2019). Hedonism, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Population Ethics

- Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). The Repugnant Conclusion. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). *Future generations: A challenge for moral theory*. PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
- Hilary Greaves (2017). Population Axiology. *Philosophy Compass*. 12(11).
- Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion. In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics*. Oxford University Press.
- Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. *Mind*. 117(468): 899-933.
- Derek Parfit (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Maximizing, Satisficing and Scalar Utilitarianism

- Ben Bradley (2006). Against Satisficing Consequentialism. *Utilitas*. 18(2): 97–108.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2020). Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good. In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press. pp. 498–512.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2019). Willpower Satisficing. *Noûs* 53(2): 251–265.

- Alastair Norcross (2020). *Morality by Degrees: Reasons Without Demands*. Oxford University Press.
- Alastair Norcross (2006). The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism. In Henry West (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism*. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 217–32.
- Neil Sinhababu (2018). Scalar consequentialism the right way. *Philosophical Studies*. 175: 3131–3144.

Expectational Utilitarianism Versus Objective Utilitarianism

- Roger Crisp (1997). *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism*. Routledge, pp. 99–101.
- Peter A. Graham (2021). *Subjective Versus Objective Moral Wrongness*. Cambridge University Press.
- Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. *Ethics*, 101(3): 461–482.

Multi-level Utilitarianism Versus Single-level Utilitarianism

- Roger Crisp (1997). *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism*. Routledge, pp. 105–112.
- Richard M. Hare (1981). *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point*. Oxford University Press.
- Peter Railton (1984). Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. 13(2): 134–171.

Global Utilitarianism and Hybrid Utilitarianism

- Brian McElwee (2020). The Ambitions of Consequentialism. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*. 17(2).
- Richard Y. Chappell (2012). Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. *Philosophical Quarterly*. 62(249): 684–704.
- Richard Y. Chappell. Consequentialism: Core and Expansion, forthcoming in D. Copp, C. Rosati, and T. Rulli (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics*. Oxford University Press.
- Toby Ord (2009). *Beyond Action: Applying Consequentialism to Decision Making and Motivation*. DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford.
- Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). Global Consequentialism. In Hooker, B., Mason, E. & Miller, D. (eds.). *Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader*. Edinburgh University Press.

Chapter 3: Arguments for Utilitarianism

Resources for Arguments for Utilitarianism:

- John Broome (1987). Utilitarianism and Expected Utility, *The Journal of Philosophy* 84 (8): 405–422.
- John Broome (1991). *Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time*. Blackwell.
- Krister Bykvist (2010). *Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed*. Continuum.
- Robert Goodin (1995). *Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Johan Gustafsson (2021). Utilitarianism without Moral Aggregation. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 51 (4): 256-269.
- Caspar Hare (2016). Should We Wish Well to All?, *Philosophical Review* 125(4): 451–472.
- John C. Harsanyi (1955). Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, *The Journal of Political Economy* 63 (4): 309–321.
- John C. Harsanyi (1977). *Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Chapter 2: Justifications, in *Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- J.J.C. Smart (1973). An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics, in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 4: Theories of Well-Being

Resources for Theories of Well-Being:

Introduction

- Roger Crisp (2017). Well-Being. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.
- Eden Lin (2022). Well-being, part 1: The concept of well-being. *Philosophy Compass*. 17(2).
- Eden Lin (2022). Well-being, part 2: Theories of well-being. *Philosophy Compass*. 17(2).
- Derek Parfit (1984). Appendix I: What Makes Someone's Life Go Best, *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Welfarism

- Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. *Utilitas*. 15(2): 151–174.
- Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp (1996). Welfarism in moral theory. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. 74(4): 598–613.

Hedonism

- Andrew Moore (2019). Hedonism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Ole Martin Moen (2016). An Argument for Hedonism. *The Journal of Value Inquiry*. 50: 267–281 (2016).
- Ivar Labukt (2012). Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure. *Utilitas*. 24(2): 172–199.
- Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 73(3): 619–645.
- Fred Feldman (2004). *Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Desire Theories

- Chris Heathwood (2015). *Desire-fulfillment theory*, in Guy Fletcher (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being*. London: Routledge.
- Peter Singer (2011). Chapter 1: About Ethics, in *Practical Ethics* (3rd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chris Heathwood (2006). Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. *Philosophical Studies*. 128: 539–563.
- Mark Murphy (2002). The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory. *Noûs*. 33(2): 247–272.
- Wlodek Rabinowicz & Jan Österberg (1996). Value Based on Preferences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism. *Economics and Philosophy*. 12(1): 1–27.

Objective List Theories

- Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for an Objective List Theory of Well-Being. *Utilitas*. 25(2): 206–220.
- James Griffin (1986). *Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Eden Lin (2014). Pluralism about Well-Being. *Philosophical Perspectives*. 28(1): 127–154.

Chapter 5: Population Ethics

Resources for Population Ethics:

General Discussions of Population Ethics

- Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory. PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2021). Section 7: Population Ethics, *Parfit's Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hilary Greaves (2017). Population Axiology. *Philosophy Compass*. 12(11).
- Derek Parfit (1984). Part Four: Future Generations, *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The Total View and Repugnant Conclusion

- Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). The Repugnant Conclusion. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). The Very Repugnant Conclusion. In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), *Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist*. Uppsala, pp. 29–44.
- Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion. In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics*. Oxford University Press.
- Spears, D. & Budolfson, M. (2021). Repugnant conclusions. *Social Choice and Welfare*. 28.
- Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. *Mind*. 117(468): 899–933.
- Torbjörn Tännsjö (2002). Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion. *Utilitas*. 14(3): 339–359.
- Stéphane Zuber et al. (2021). What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion? *Utilitas*. 33(4): 379–383.

Variable Value Theories

- Theodore Sider (1991). Might Theory X be a theory of diminishing marginal value? *Analysis*. 51(4): 265–271.
- Thomas Hurka (1983). Value and Population Size. *Ethics*, 93(3): 496–507.

Critical Level and Critical Range Theories

- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, & David J. Donaldson (1995). Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles. *Econometrica*, 63(6): 1303–1320.

- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, & David J. Donaldson (2005). *Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- John Broome (2004). *Weighing Lives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Johan Gustafsson (2020). Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value. *Economics & Philosophy*, 36: 81–110.

Neutrality Intuition

- Jeff McMahan (2013). Causing People to Exist and Saving People's Lives. *Journal of Ethics*. 17: 5–35.
- Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality. *Philosophical Issues*. 19(1): 389–411.
- Kryster Bykvist (2007). The Benefits of Coming into Existence. *Philosophical Studies*. 135(3), 335–362.
- John Broome (2005). Should We Value Population?. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*. 13(4): 399–413.
- Elizabeth Harman (2004). Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?. *Philosophical Perspectives*. 18: 89–113.

Person-Affecting Views and the Asymmetry

- Gustaf Arrhenius (2009). Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?, in Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (eds.) *Harming Future Persons*. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine. 35. Springer, Dordrecht.
- Daniel Cohen (2019). An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry. *Utilitas*. 32(1): 70–89.
- Johann Frick (2014). *'Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People': A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics*. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
- Johann Frick (2020). Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry. *Philosophical Perspectives*. 34(1): 53–87
- Caspar Hare (2007). Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?. *Ethics*, 117(3): 498–523.
- Jan Narveson (1973). Moral Problems of Population. *The Monist*. 57(1): 62–86.
- Josh Parsons (2002). Axiological Actualism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. 80(2): 137–147.
- Melinda A. Roberts (2002). A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person-Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem. *Ethics*, 112(2): 315–350.

Practical Implications of Population Ethics

- Toby Ord (2020). *The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- David Althaus & Lukas Gloor (2018). Reducing Risks of Astronomical Suffering: a Neglected Priority. *Center on Long-Term Risk*.
- Nick Beckstead (2013). *On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future*. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
- William MacAskill (2022). *What We Owe the Future*. Basic Books.

Impossibility Theorems in Population Ethics

- Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies. *Economics and Philosophy*. 16(2): 247–266.
- Philip Kitcher (2000). Parfit's Puzzle. *Noûs*. 34(4): 550–577.
- Erik Carlson (1998). Mere addition and two trilemmas of population ethics. *Economics and Philosophy*. 14(2): 283–306.
- Yew-Kwang Ng (1989). What should we do about future generations? Impossibility of Parfit's Theory X. *Economics and Philosophy*. 5(2): 235–253.

Chapter 6: Utilitarianism and Practical Ethics

Resources for Utilitarianism and Practical Ethics:

Is There a Difference Between Doing and Allowing Harm?

- Fiona Woollard & Frances Howard-Snyder (2016). Doing vs. Allowing Harm. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Jonathan Bennett (1995). *The Act Itself*. Oxford University Press.

The Expanding Moral Circle

- Peter Singer (1997). The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle. *New Internationalist*.
- Peter Singer (2011). *The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cosmopolitanism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Geography

- Poverty & Our Response to It: Crash Course Philosophy #44

- Peter Singer (2019). *The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty*, 2nd ed. The Life You Can Save, Bainbridge Island, WA and Sydney, available free at <www.thelifeyoucansave.org>.
- Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. 1(2): 229–243.
- Samuel Scheffler (1999). Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism. *Utilitas*. 11(3): 255–276.

Anti-Speciesism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Species

- Non-Human Animals: Crash Course Philosophy #42
- Peter Singer (2023) *Animal Liberation Now: The Definitive Classic Renewed*, New York: HarperCollins.
- Jeff McMahan (2002). Animals. In R. G. Frey and Christopher Wellman (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Applied Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 525–536.
- Jeff Sebo (2019). A Utilitarian Case for Animal Rights. *Effective Altruism Global*.

Longtermism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Time

- Toby Ord (2020). *The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Hilary Greaves & William MacAskill (2019). The Case for Strong Longtermism. *Global Priorities Institute*.
- Nick Beckstead (2013). *On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future*. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
- Nick Bostrom (2003). Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development. *Utilitas*. 15(3): 308–314.
- William MacAskill (2022). *What We Owe the Future*. Basic Books.

Respecting Commonsense Moral Norms

- Allan Gibbard (1984). Utilitarianism and Human Rights. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 1(2): 92–102.
- R.M. Hare (1981). *Moral Thinking*. Oxford University Press.
- J.L. Mackie (1985). Rights, Utility, and Universalization. In R.G. Frey (ed.) *Utility and Rights*. Basil Blackwell.
- Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 64(4): 438–455.

Chapter 7: Near-Utilitarian Alternatives

Resources for Near-Utilitarian Alternatives:

Beyond Welfarism

- Richard Routley (1973). Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?. *Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy*, 1: 205–210.
- Elizabeth Anderson (1999). What is the Point of Equality? *Ethics* 109 (2): 287–337.
- Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. *Ratio*, 10 (3): 202–221.

Prioritarianism

- Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. *Ratio*, 10(3): 202–221.
- Johan E. Gustafsson (2021). *Ex-Ante Prioritarianism Violates Sequential Ex-Ante Pareto*. *Utilitas*, 1–11.
- Joshua Greene & Jonathan Baron (2001). Intuitions about Declining Marginal Utility. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, 14: 243–55.

Desert-Adjusted Views

- Fred Feldman (1995). Adjusting utility for justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 55(3): 567–585.

Egoism and Partialism

- Simon Keller (2013). *Partiality*. Princeton University Press.
- Derek Parfit (1984). Part Two: Rationality and Time, *Reasons and Persons*. Clarendon Press.
- Andreas Mogensen (2022). The only ethical argument for positive δ?. *Philosophical Studies* 179: 2731–2750.
- Troy Jollimore (2018). Impartiality. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Robert Goodin (1988). What is so special about our fellow countrymen? *Ethics* 98(4): 663–686.

Beyond Consequentialism

- John Taurek (1977). Should the numbers count?. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6(4): 293–316.
- David Ross (1930). *The Right and the Good*. Clarendon Press.
- Elizabeth Ashford (2003) The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism. *Ethics* 113(2): 273–302.

Chapter 8: Objections to Utilitarianism and Responses

Resources for Objections to Utilitarianism and Responses:

General

- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). *Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4: Objections.
- J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams (1973). *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Rights Objection

- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). *Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4: Objections, Section "Does utilitarianism tell us to act immorally?".
- Krister Bykvist (2010). *Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed*. London: Continuum. Chapter 8: Is Utilitarianism too Permissive?
- Shelly Kagan (1998). *Normative Ethics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chapter 3.
- Shelly Kagan (1989). *The Limits of Morality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eduardo Rivera-López (2012). The Moral Murderer. A (more) effective counterexample to consequentialism. *Ratio*, 25(3): 307–325.
- Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976). Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. *The Monist*. 59 (2): 204–17
- Scott Woodcock (2017). When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. 95 (2): 299–316.

The Mere Means Objection

- Samuel Kerstein (2019). Treating Persons as Means, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Derek Parfit (2011). *On What Matters: Vol 1*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 9: Merely as a Means.

The Separateness of Persons Objection

- David Brink (2020). Consequentialism, the Separateness of Persons, and Aggregation. In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2021). *Parfit's Ethics*, section 3.2. Cambridge University Press.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2015). Value Receptacles. *Noûs*, 49(2): 322–332.

- G.A. Cohen (2011). Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value. In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (eds.), *Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon*. Oxford University Press.
- Stephan Dickert, Daniel Västfjäll, Janet Kleber, and Paul Slovic (2015). Scope insensitivity: The limits of intuitive valuation of human lives in public policy. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition*, 4(3): 248–255.
- Robert Nozick (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia.* Basic Books.
- Derek Parfit (2003). Justifiability to Each Person. *Ratio,* 16(4): 368–390
- Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2010). *Utilitarianism: The Aggregation Question*. Cambridge University Press.
- John Rawls (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Belknap Press.
- T.M. Scanlon (1998). *What We Owe to Each Other*. Belknap Press.

The Demandingness Objection

- Brian Berkey (2016). The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium. *Philosophical Studies*. 173(11): 3015–3035.
- Krister Bykvist (2010). *Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed*. London: Continuum. Chapter 7: Is Utilitarianism too Demanding?
- Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent work on the Limits of Obligation. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. 13(3): 239–254.
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2014). *The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 317–336.
- Andreas Mogensen (2020). Moral demands and the far future. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 103(3): 567-585.
- Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1(3): 229–243.
- David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. *Philosophers' Imprint*. 7(8): 1–17.
- Susan Wolf (1982). Moral Saints. *The Journal of Philosophy*. 79(8): 419–434.

The Alienation Objection

- Richard Y. Chappell, (2021). The Right Wrong-Makers. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 103(2): 426–440.
- Barry Maguire & Calvin Baker (2020). The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism, in D. Portmore (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.

- Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 64(4): 438–455.
- Peter Railton (1984). Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 13(2): 134–171.
- Michael Stocker (1976). The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories. *Journal of Philosophy*, 73: 453–466.
- Bernard Williams (1981). Persons, Character and Morality. In *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973–1980*, Cambridge University Press.

The Special Obligations Objection

- Jim A.C. Everett, Nadira S. Faber, Julian Savulescu, and Molly J. Crockett (2018). The costs of being consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial beneficence. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 79: 200–216.
- Robert Goodin (1988). What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen? *Ethics*, 98(4): 663–686.
- Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. *Ethics*, 101(3): 461–482.
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2012). The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason. *Ethics*, 123(1): 9–31.
- Derek Parfit (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The Equality Objection

- Roger Crisp (2003). Equality, Priority, and Compassion. *Ethics*, 113(4): 745–763.
- Toby Ord (2015). A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism. *Utilitas*, 27(3): 298–302.
- Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. *Ratio*, 10(3): 202–221.
- Larry Temkin (1993). Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Larry Temkin (2003). Equality, Priority or What?. *Economics and Philosophy*, 19(1): 61–87.

The Cluelessness Objection

- Joanna Burch-Brown (2014). Clues for Consequentialists. *Utilitas*, 26(1): 105–119.
- Hilary Greaves (2016). Cluelessness. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 116(3): 311–339.
- James Lenman (2000). Consequentialism and Cluelessness. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 29(4): 342–370.
- Andreas Mogensen (2021). Maximal Cluelessness. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 71: 141–162.

- Andreas Mogensen & William MacAskill (2021). The Paralysis Argument. *Philosophers' Imprint* 21 (15): 1–17.
- David Thorstad, and Andreas Mogensen (2020). Heuristics for clueless agents: how to get away with ignoring what matters most in ordinary decision-making. *GPI Working Paper* 2-2020.

The Abusability Objection

- Allan Gibbard (1984). Utilitarianism and Human Rights. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 1(2): 92–102.
- R.M. Hare (1981). *Moral Thinking*. Oxford University Press.
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2010). Secrecy in Consequentialism: A defence of esoteric morality. *Ratio*, 23(1): 34–58.
- J.L. Mackie (1985). Rights, Utility, and Universalization. In R.G. Frey (ed.) *Utility and Rights*. Basil Blackwell.
- Derek Parfit (1984). *Reasons and Persons*, Part One: Self-Defeating Theories. Clarendon Press.
- Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 64(4): 438–455.
- Bernard Williams (1973). A Critique of Utilitarianism. In J.J.C Smart & Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. Cambridge University Press.

Acting on Utilitarianism

Resources for Acting on Utilitarianism

General

- Peter Singer (2011). *Practical Ethics*, 3rd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Effective Altruism

- William MacAskill (forthcoming). Effective Altruism. *The Norton Introduction to Ethics*, Elizabeth Harman & Alex Guerrero (eds.).[^40]
- William MacAskill (2015). *Doing Good Better: Effective Altruism and How You Can Make a Difference*. New York: Penguin Random House.
- William MacAskill (2018). What Are the Most Important Moral Problems of Our Time? *TED*.
- Peter Singer (2013). The Why and How of Effective Altruism. *TED*.

- Richard Y. Chappell (2024). Why Not Effective Altruism?. *Public Affairs Quarterly* 38 (1): 3-21.
- Websites and organizations relevant to effective altruism:
  - Effectivealtruism.org: Website providing online resources about effective altruism.
  - Effective Altruism Forum: An online forum for discussing issues related to effective altruism.
  - GiveWell: Charity evaluator aiming to find outstanding giving opportunities.
  - 80,000 Hours: Research non-profit aiming to help talented individuals maximize the social impact of their careers.
  - Giving What We Can: Community of people having pledged to give 10% of their lifetime earnings to effective charities.
  - Charity Entrepreneurship: Charity incubator helping start multiple high-impact charities annually.
- Podcasts on effective altruism & utilitarianism:
  - Effective Altruism: An Introduction. *80,000 Hours Podcast*.
  - William MacAskill (2020). Doing Good. *Making Sense Podcast with Sam Harris*.
  - Peter Singer (2016). What is Moral Progress?. *Making Sense Podcast with Sam Harris*.
  - Peter Singer & Kasia de Lazari Radek (2024) Lives Well Lived

Global Health and Development

- Peter Singer (2019). *The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty*, 2nd ed. The Life You Can Save, Bainbridge Island, WA and Sydney, available free at <www.thelifeyoucansave.org>.
- Toby Ord (2019).The Moral Imperative toward Cost-Effectiveness in Global Health, in Greaves, H. (ed.) *Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Farm Animal Welfare

- Tyler John and Jeff Sebo (2020). Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals. In *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*, Douglas W. Portmore (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Existential Risks

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Peter Singer's 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality'

Resources for Study Guide: Peter Singer's 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality'

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- Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau (2019). Beneficence: Does Agglomeration Matter? *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 36 (1): 17-33.
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- Richard Miller (2004). Beneficence, Duty and Distance. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 32(4): 357–383.
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- William Sin (2010). Trivial Sacrifices, Great Demands. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 7 (1): 3-15.
- Michael Slote (2007). Famine, Affluence, and Virtue, in *Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems*, ed. Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 279–296.
- Aksel Braanen Sterri & Ole Martin Moen (2021). The ethics of emergencies. *Philosophical Studies,* 178 (8): 2621–2634.
- Jordan Arthur Thomson (2021). Relief from Rescue. *Philosophical Studies* 179 (4): 1221-1239.
- Travis Timmerman (2015). Sometimes there is nothing wrong with letting a child drown. *Analysis*, 75(2): 204–212.

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