Resources and Further Reading

Chapter 1: Introduction to Utilitarianism

Resources for Introduction to Utilitarianism:

Introduction

• Utilitarianism: Crash Course Philosophy #36
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum.
• Kwame Anthony Appiah. What is Utiiltarianism?, Royal Institute of Philosophy 15-Minute Masterclass.

The Classics

• Jeremy Bentham (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
• John Stuart Mill (1863). Utilitarianism.
• Henry Sidgwick (1874). The Methods of Ethics.

Further Reading

• Julia Driver (2014). The History of Utilitarianism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Bart Schultz (2017). The Happiness Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• James Crimmins (2017). The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism. Bloomsbury.
• Derek Parfit (2017). On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Yew-Kwang Ng (1990). Welfarism and Utilitarianism: A Rehabilitation. Utilitas. 2(2): 171–193.

Chapter 2: Elements and Types of Utilitarianism

Resources for Elements and Types of Utilitarianism:

Consequentialism

• Julia Driver (2011). Consequentialism, New Problems of Philosophy. José Luis Bermúdez (ed.). Abingdon: Routledge.
• Samuel Scheffler (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2015). Consequentialism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Welfarism & Theories of Well-Being

• Roger Crisp (2017). Well-Being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. Utilitas. 15(2): 151–174.
• Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.

Impartiality

• Robert Goodin (1988). What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics, 98 (4): 663-686.
• Troy Jollimore (2018). Impartiality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Aggregationism

• John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time. London: Wiley-Blackwell. Chapters 4 and 10.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Chapter 5: Utilitarian Aggregation.
• Alastair Norcross (1997). Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 26(2): 135–167.

Hedonism

• Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 73(3): 619–645.
• Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford University Press.
• Shelly Kagan (1992).The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.
• Ole Martin Moen (2016). An Argument for Hedonism. The Journal of Value Inquiry. 50: 267–281.
• Andrew Moore (2019). Hedonism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Population Ethics

• Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). The Repugnant Conclusion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). Future generations: A challenge for moral theory. PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
• Hilary Greaves (2017). Population Axiology. Philosophy Compass. 12(11).
• Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion. In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press.
• Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. Mind. 117(468): 899-933.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Maximizing, Satisficing and Scalar Utilitarianism

• Ben Bradley (2006). Against Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas. 18(2): 97–108.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2020). Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good. In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 498–512.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2019). Willpower Satisficing. Noûs 53(2): 251–265.
• Alastair Norcross (2020). Morality by Degrees: Reasons Without Demands. Oxford University Press.
• Alastair Norcross (2006). The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism. In Henry West (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 217–32.
• Neil Sinhababu (2018). Scalar consequentialism the right way. Philosophical Studies. 175: 3131–3144.

Expectational Utilitarianism Versus Objective Utilitarianism

• Roger Crisp (1997). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism. Routledge, pp. 99–101.
• Peter A. Graham (2021). Subjective Versus Objective Moral Wrongness. Cambridge University Press.
• Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics, 101(3): 461–482.

Multi-level Utilitarianism Versus Single-level Utilitarianism

• Roger Crisp (1997). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism. Routledge, pp. 105–112.
• Richard M. Hare (1981). Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford University Press.
• Peter Railton (1984). Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 13(2): 134–171.

Global Utilitarianism and Hybrid Utilitarianism

• Brian McElwee (2020). The Ambitions of Consequentialism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 17(2).
• Richard Y. Chappell (2012). Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. Philosophical Quarterly. 62(249): 684–704.
• Richard Y. Chappell. Consequentialism: Core and Expansion, forthcoming in D. Copp, C. Rosati, and T. Rulli (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.
• Toby Ord (2009). Beyond Action: Applying Consequentialism to Decision Making and Motivation. DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford.
• Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). Global Consequentialism. In Hooker, B., Mason, E. & Miller, D. (eds.). Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press.

Chapter 3: Arguments for Utilitarianism

Resources for Arguments for Utilitarianism:

• John Broome (1987). Utilitarianism and Expected Utility, The Journal of Philosophy 84 (8): 405–422.
• John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Blackwell.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum.
• Robert Goodin (1995). Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
• Caspar Hare (2016). Should We Wish Well to All?, Philosophical Review 125(4): 451–472.
• John C. Harsanyi (1955). Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, The Journal of Political Economy 63 (4): 309–321.
• John C. Harsanyi (1977). Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge University Press.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Chapter 2: Justifications, in Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
• J.J.C. Smart (1973). An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics, in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 4: Theories of Well-Being

Resources for Theories of Well-Being:

Introduction

• Roger Crisp (2017). Well-Being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.
• Eden Lin (2022). Well‐being, part 1: The concept of well‐being. Philosophy Compass. 17(2).
• Eden Lin (2022). Well‐being, part 2: Theories of well‐being. Philosophy Compass. 17(2).
• Derek Parfit (1984). Appendix I: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Welfarism

• Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. Utilitas. 15(2): 151–174.
• Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp (1996). Welfarism in moral theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74(4): 598–613.

Hedonism

• Andrew Moore (2019). Hedonism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Ole Martin Moen (2016). An Argument for Hedonism. The Journal of Value Inquiry. 50: 267–281 (2016).
• Ivar Labukt (2012). Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure. Utilitas. 24(2): 172–199.
• Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 73(3): 619–645.
• Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Desire Theories

• Chris Heathwood (2015). Desire-fulfillment theory, in Guy Fletcher (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. London: Routledge.
• Peter Singer (2011). Chapter 1: About Ethics, in Practical Ethics (3rd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Chris Heathwood (2006). Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. Philosophical Studies. 128: 539–563.
• Mark Murphy (2002). The Simple Desire‐Fulfillment Theory. Noûs. 33(2): 247–272.
• Wlodek Rabinowicz & Jan Österberg (1996). Value Based on Preferences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism. Economics and Philosophy. 12(1): 1–27.

Objective List Theories

• Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for an Objective List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas. 25(2): 206–220.
• James Griffin (1986). Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Eden Lin (2014). Pluralism about Well-Being. Philosophical Perspectives. 28(1): 127–154.

Chapter 5: Population Ethics

Resources for Population Ethics:

General Discussions of Population Ethics

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory. PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2021). Section 7: Population Ethics, Parfit’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hilary Greaves (2017). Population Axiology. Philosophy Compass. 12(11).
• Derek Parfit (1984). Part Four: Future Generations, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The Total View and Repugnant Conclusion

• Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). The Repugnant Conclusion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). The Very Repugnant Conclusion. In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist. Uppsala, pp. 29–44.
• Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion. In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press.
• Spears, D. & Budolfson, M. (2021). Repugnant conclusions. Social Choice and Welfare. 28.
• Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. Mind. 117(468): 899–933.
• Torbjörn Tännsjö (2002). Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas. 14(3): 339–359.
• Stéphane Zuber et al. (2021). What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion? Utilitas. 33(4): 379–383.

Variable Value Theories

• Theodore Sider (1991). Might Theory X be a theory of diminishing marginal value? Analysis. 51(4): 265–271.
• Thomas Hurka (1983). Value and Population Size. Ethics, 93(3): 496–507.

Critical Level and Critical Range Theories

• Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, & David J. Donaldson (1995). Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles. Econometrica, 63(6): 1303–1320.
• Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, & David J. Donaldson (2005). Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• John Broome (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Johan Gustafsson (2020). Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value. Economics & Philosophy, 36: 81–110.

Neutrality Intuition

• Jeff McMahan (2013). Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives. Journal of Ethics. 17: 5–35.
• Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality. Philosophical Issues. 19(1): 389–411.
• Kryster Bykvist (2007). The Benefits of Coming into Existence. Philosophical Studies. 135(3), 335–362.
• John Broome (2005). Should We Value Population?. The Journal of Political Philosophy. 13(4): 399–413.
• Elizabeth Harman (2004). Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?. Philosophical Perspectives. 18: 89–113.

Person-Affecting Views and the Asymmetry

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2009). Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?, in Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (eds.) Harming Future Persons. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine. 35. Springer, Dordrecht.
• Daniel Cohen (2019). An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry. Utilitas. 32(1): 70–89.
• Johann Frick (2014). ‘Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People’: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
• Johann Frick (2020). Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry. Philosophical Perspectives. 34(1): 53–87
• Caspar Hare (2007). Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?. Ethics, 117(3): 498–523.
• Jan Narveson (1973). Moral Problems of Population. The Monist. 57(1): 62–86.
• Josh Parsons (2002). Axiological Actualism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 80(2): 137–147.
• Melinda A. Roberts (2002). A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person-Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem. Ethics, 112(2): 315–350.

Practical Implications of Population Ethics

• Toby Ord (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. Bloomsbury Publishing.
• David Althaus & Lukas Gloor (2018). Reducing Risks of Astronomical Suffering: a Neglected Priority. Center on Long-Term Risk.
• Nick Beckstead (2013). On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
• William MacAskill (2022). What We Owe the Future. Basic Books.

Impossibility Theorems in Population Ethics

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies. Economics and Philosophy. 16(2): 247–266.
• Philip Kitcher (2000). Parfit’s Puzzle. Noûs. 34(4): 550–577.
• Erik Carlson (1998). Mere addition and two trilemmas of population ethics. Economics and Philosophy. 14(2): 283–306.
• Yew-Kwang Ng (1989). What should we do about future generations? Impossibility of Parfit’s Theory X. Economics and Philosophy. 5(2): 235–253.

Chapter 6: Utilitarianism and Practical Ethics

Resources for Utilitarianism and Practical Ethics:

Is There a Difference Between Doing and Allowing Harm?

• Fiona Woollard & Frances Howard-Snyder (2016). Doing vs. Allowing Harm. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Jonathan Bennett (1995). The Act Itself. Oxford University Press.

The Expanding Moral Circle

• Peter Singer (1997). The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle. New Internationalist.
• Peter Singer (1981). The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cosmopolitanism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Geography

• Poverty & Our Response to It: Crash Course Philosophy #44
• Peter Singer (2009). The Life You Can Save. New York: Penguin Random House. (the book is available for free download)
• Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1(2): 229–243.
• Samuel Scheffler (1999). Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism. Utilitas. 11(3): 255–276.

Anti-Speciesism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Species

• Non-Human Animals: Crash Course Philosophy #42
• Peter Singer (1975). Animal Liberation. New York: HarperCollins.
• Jeff McMahan (2002). Animals. In R. G. Frey and Christopher Wellman (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 525–536.
• Jeff Sebo (2019). A Utilitarian Case for Animal Rights. Effective Altruism Global.

Longtermism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Time

• Toby Ord (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
• Hilary Greaves & William MacAskill (2019). The Case for Strong Longtermism. Global Priorities Institute.
• Nick Beckstead (2013). On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
• Nick Bostrom (2003). Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development. Utilitas. 15(3): 308–314.
• William MacAskill (2022). What We Owe the Future. Basic Books.

Respecting Commonsense Moral Norms

• Allan Gibbard (1984). Utilitarianism and Human Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 1(2): 92–102.
• R.M. Hare (1981). Moral Thinking. Oxford University Press.
• J.L. Mackie (1985). Rights, Utility, and Universalization. In R.G. Frey (ed.) Utility and Rights. Basil Blackwell.
• Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(4): 438–455.

Chapter 7: Near-Utilitarian Alternatives

Resources for Near-Utilitarian Alternatives:

Beyond Welfarism

• Richard Routley (1973). Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?. Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1: 205–210.
• Elizabeth Anderson (1999). What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109 (2): 287–337.
• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10 (3): 202–221.

Prioritarianism

• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10(3): 202–221.
• Johan E. Gustafsson (2021). Ex-Ante Prioritarianism Violates Sequential Ex‑Ante Pareto. Utilitas, 1–11.
• Joshua Greene & Jonathan Baron (2001). Intuitions about Declining Marginal Utility. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14: 243–55.

Desert-Adjusted Views

• Fred Feldman (1995). Adjusting utility for justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(3): 567–585.

Egoism and Partialism

• Simon Keller (2013). Partiality. Princeton University Press.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Part Two: Rationality and Time, Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press.
• Andreas Mogensen (2022). The only ethical argument for positive 𝛿?. Philosophical Studies 179: 2731–2750.
• Troy Jollimore (2018). Impartiality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Robert Goodin (1988). What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics 98(4): 663–686.

Beyond Consequentialism

• John Taurek (1977). Should the numbers count?. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4): 293–316.
• David Ross (1930). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
• Elizabeth Ashford (2003) The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism. Ethics 113(2): 273–302.

Chapter 8: Objections to Utilitarianism and Responses

Resources for Objections to Utilitarianism and Responses:

General

• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4: Objections.
• J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams (1973). Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Rights Objection

• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4: Objections, Section “Does utilitarianism tell us to act immorally?”.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Chapter 8: Is Utilitarianism too Permissive?
• Shelly Kagan (1998). Normative Ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chapter 3.
• Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Eduardo Rivera-López (2012). The Moral Murderer. A (more) effective counterexample to consequentialism. Ratio, 25(3): 307–325.
• Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976). Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. The Monist. 59 (2): 204–17
• Scott Woodcock (2017). When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 95 (2): 299–316.

The Mere Means Objection

• Samuel Kerstein (2019). Treating Persons as Means, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters: Vol 1. Oxford University Press. Chapter 9: Merely as a Means.

The Separateness of Persons Objection

• David Brink (2020). Consequentialism, the Separateness of Persons, and Aggregation. In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2021). Parfit’s Ethics, section 3.2. Cambridge University Press.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2015). Value Receptacles. Noûs, 49(2): 322–332.
• G.A. Cohen (2011). Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value. In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press.
• Stephan Dickert, Daniel Västfjäll, Janet Kleber, and Paul Slovic (2015). Scope insensitivity: The limits of intuitive valuation of human lives in public policy. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4(3): 248–255.
• Robert Nozick (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books.
• Derek Parfit (2003). Justifiability to Each Person. Ratio, 16(4): 368–390
• Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2010). Utilitarianism: The Aggregation Question. Cambridge University Press.
• John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press.
• T.M. Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press.

The Demandingness Objection

• Brian Berkey (2016). The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium. Philosophical Studies. 173(11): 3015–3035.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Chapter 7: Is Utilitarianism too Demanding?
• Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 13(3): 239–254.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2014). The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 317–336.
• Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3): 229–243.
• David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers’ Imprint. 7(8): 1–17.
• Susan Wolf (1982). Moral Saints. The Journal of Philosophy. 79(8): 419–434.

The Alienation Objection

• Richard Y. Chappell, (2021). The Right Wrong-Makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2): 426–440.
• Barry Maguire & Calvin Baker (2020). The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism, in D. Portmore (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
• Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(4): 438–455.
• Peter Railton (1984). Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13(2): 134–171.
• Michael Stocker (1976). The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories. Journal of Philosophy, 73: 453–466.
• Bernard Williams (1981). Persons, Character and Morality. In Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973–1980, Cambridge University Press.

The Special Obligations Objection

• Jim A.C. Everett, Nadira S. Faber, Julian Savulescu, and Molly J. Crockett (2018). The costs of being consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial beneficence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 79: 200–216.
• Robert Goodin (1988). What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen? Ethics, 98(4): 663–686.
• Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics, 101(3): 461–482.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2012). The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason. Ethics, 123(1): 9–31.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The Equality Objection

• Roger Crisp (2003). Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics, 113(4): 745–763.
• Toby Ord (2015). A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism. Utilitas, 27(3): 298–302.
• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10(3): 202–221.
• Larry Temkin (1993). Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Larry Temkin (2003). Equality, Priority or What?. Economics and Philosophy, 19(1): 61–87.

The Cluelessness Objection

• Joanna Burch-Brown (2014). Clues for Consequentialists. Utilitas, 26(1): 105–119.
• Hilary Greaves (2016). Cluelessness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116(3): 311–339.
• James Lenman (2000). Consequentialism and Cluelessness. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29(4): 342–370.
• Andreas Mogensen (2021). Maximal Cluelessness. The Philosophical Quarterly, 71: 141–162.
• Andreas Mogensen & William MacAskill (2021). The Paralysis Argument. Philosophers’ Imprint 21 (15): 1–17.
• David Thorstad, and Andreas Mogensen (2020). Heuristics for clueless agents: how to get away with ignoring what matters most in ordinary decision-making. GPI Working Paper 2-2020.

The Abusability Objection

• Allan Gibbard (1984). Utilitarianism and Human Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 1(2): 92–102.
• R.M. Hare (1981). Moral Thinking. Oxford University Press.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2010). Secrecy in Consequentialism: A defence of esoteric morality. Ratio, 23(1): 34–58.
• J.L. Mackie (1985). Rights, Utility, and Universalization. In R.G. Frey (ed.) Utility and Rights. Basil Blackwell.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons, Part One: Self-Defeating Theories. Clarendon Press.
• Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(4): 438–455.
• Bernard Williams (1973). A Critique of Utilitarianism. In J.J.C Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.

Acting on Utilitarianism

Resources for Acting on Utilitarianism

General

• Peter Singer (2011). Practical Ethics, 3rd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Chapter 6: Utilitarianism in Action, Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Effective Altruism

• William MacAskill (2019). Effective Altruism. The Norton Introduction to Ethics, Elizabeth Harman & Alex Guerrero (eds.).
• William MacAskill (2015). Doing Good Better: Effective Altruism and How You Can Make a Difference. New York: Penguin Random House.
• William MacAskill (2018). What Are the Most Important Moral Problems of Our Time? TED.
• Peter Singer (2013). The Why and How of Effective Altruism. TED.
• Websites and organizations relevant to effective altruism:
  • Effectivealtruism.org: Website providing online resources about effective altruism.
  • GiveWell: Charity evaluator aiming to find outstanding giving opportunities.
  • 80,000 Hours: Research non-profit aiming to help talented individuals maximize the social impact of their careers.
  • Giving What We Can: Community of people having pledged to give 10% of their lifetime earnings to effective charities.
  • Charity Entrepreneurship: Charity incubator helping start multiple high-impact charities annually.
• Podcasts on effective altruism & utilitarianism:
  • Effective Altruism: An Introduction. 80,000 Hours Podcast.
  • William MacAskill (2020). Doing Good. Making Sense Podcast with Sam Harris.
  • Peter Singer (2016). What is Moral Progress?. Making Sense Podcast with Sam Harris.
  • Gus Docker. Utilitarian Podcast.

Global Health and Development

• Peter Singer (2019). The Life You Can Save, updated 10th anniversary edition. New York: Penguin Random House. (The book is available for free download)
• Toby Ord (2019).The Moral Imperative toward Cost-Effectiveness in Global Health, in Greaves, H. (ed.) Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Peter Unger (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Farm Animal Welfare

• Tyler John and Jeff Sebo (2020). Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals. In The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, Douglas W. Portmore (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lewis Bollard (2021). Lewis Bollard on big wins against factory farming and how they happened. 80,000 Hours Podcast with Rob Wiblin.
• Jess Whittlestone (2017). Animal Welfare. Effective Altruism.

Existential Risks

• Toby Ord (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
• Nick Bostrom (2013). Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Global Policy. 4(1): 15–31.

Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’

Resources for Study Guide: Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’

• Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3): 229–243.
• Peter Singer (2009). The Life You Can Save. (Download a free ebook or audiobook of the 10th anniversary edition at www.thelifeyoucansave.org.)
• Richard Y. Chappell & Helen Yetter-Chappell (2016). Virtue and Salience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(3): 449–463.
• Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau (2019). Beneficence: Does Agglomeration Matter? Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (1): 17-33.
• Frances Kamm (1999). Famine Ethics: The Problem of Distance in Morality and Singer’s Ethical Theory, in Singer and His Critics, ed. Dale Jamieson, Oxford: Blackwell: 174–203.
• William MacAskill (2019). Aid Scepticism and Effective Altruism. Journal of Practical Ethics, 7(1): 49–60.
• Richard Miller (2004). Beneficence, Duty and Distance. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32(4): 357–383.
• Theron Pummer (2023). The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism. Oxford University Press.
• William Sin (2010). Trivial Sacrifices, Great Demands. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (1): 3-15.
• Michael Slote (2007). Famine, Affluence, and Virtue, in Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, ed. Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 279–296.
• Aksel Braanen Sterri & Ole Martin Moen (2021). The ethics of emergencies. Philosophical Studies, 178 (8): 2621–2634.
• Jordan Arthur Thomson (2021). Relief from Rescue. Philosophical Studies 179 (4): 1221-1239.
• Travis Timmerman (2015). Sometimes there is nothing wrong with letting a child drown. Analysis, 75(2): 204–212.
• Peter Unger (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford University Press.