Resources and Further Reading

Chapter 1: Introduction to Utilitarianism

Resources for Introduction to Utilitarianism:

Introduction

• Utilitarianism: Crash Course Philosophy #36
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum.
• Kwame Anthony Appiah. What is Utiiltarianism?, Royal Institute of Philosophy 15-Minute Masterclass.

The Classics

• Jeremy Bentham (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
• John Stuart Mill (1863). Utilitarianism.
• Henry Sidgwick (1874). The Methods of Ethics.

Further Reading

• Julia Driver (2014). The History of Utilitarianism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Bart Schultz (2017). The Happiness Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• James Crimmins (2017). The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism. Bloomsbury.
• Derek Parfit (2017). On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Yew-Kwang Ng (1990). Welfarism and Utilitarianism: A Rehabilitation. Utilitas. 2(2): 171–193.

Chapter 2: Elements and Types of Utilitarianism

Resources for Elements and Types of Utilitarianism:

Consequentialism

• Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2015). Consequentialism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Julia Driver (2011). Consequentialism, New Problems of Philosophy. José Luis Bermúdez (ed.). Abingdon: Routledge.
• Samuel Scheffler (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Welfarism & Theories of Well-Being

• Roger Crisp (2017). Well-Being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. Utilitas. 15(2): 151–174.
• Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-Being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.

Impartiality

• Troy Jollimore (2018). Impartiality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Robert Goodin (1988). What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics 98 (4): 663-686.

Aggregationism

• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Chapter 5: Utilitarian Aggregation.
• Alastair Norcross (1997). Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 26(2): 135–167.
• John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time. London: Wiley-Blackwell. Chapters 4 and 10.

Hedonism

• Andrew Moore (2019). Hedonism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Ole Martin Moen (2016). An Argument for Hedonism. The Journal of Value Inquiry. 50: 267–281.
• Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 73(3): 619–645.
• Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.

Population Ethics

• Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion. In Krister Bykvist and Timothy Campbell (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hilary Greaves (2017). Population Axiology. Philosophy Compass. 12(11).
• Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). The Repugnant Conclusion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. Mind. 117(468): 899-933.
• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). Future generations: A challenge for moral theory. PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Maximizing, Satisficing and Scalar Utilitarianism

• Richard Y. Chappell (2020). Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good. In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 498–512.
• Neil Sinhababu (2018). Scalar consequentialism the right way. Philosophical Studies. 175: 3131–3144.
• Alastair Norcross (2020). Morality by Degrees: Reasons Without Demands. Oxford University Press.
• Alastair Norcross (2006). The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism. In Henry West (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism. Wiley-Blackwell., pp. 217–32.
• Ben Bradley (2006). Against Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas. 18(2): 97–108.

Expectational Utilitarianism Versus Objective Utilitarianism

• Roger Crisp (1997). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism. Routledge., pp. 99–101.
• Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics. 101(3): 461–482.
• Peter A. Graham (2021). Subjective Versus Objective Moral Wrongness. Cambridge University Press.

Multi-level Utilitarianism Versus Single-level Utilitarianism

• Hare, R.M. (1981). Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford University Press.
• Railton, P. (1984). Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 13(2): 134–171.
• Roger Crisp (1997). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism. Routledge., pp. 105–112.

Global Utilitarianism Versus Hybrid Utilitarianism

• Ord, T. (2009). Beyond Action: Applying Consequentialism to Decision Making and Motivation. DPhil Dissertation, University of Oxford.
• Pettit, P. & Smith, M (2000). Global Consequentialism. In Hooker, B., Mason, E. & Miller, D. (eds.). Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press (2000).
• McElwee, B. (2020). The Ambitions of Consequentialism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 17(2).
• Chappell, R.Y. (2012). Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. Philosophical Quarterly. 62(249): 684–704.
• Chappell, R.Y. Consequentialism: Core and Expansion, forthcoming in D. Copp, C. Rosati, and T. Rulli (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.

Chapter 3: Arguments for Utilitarianism

Resources for Arguments for Utilitarianism:

• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum.
• Robert Goodin (1995). Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
• Caspar Hare (2016). Should We Wish Well to All? Philosophical Review 125, 4: 451–472.
• Peter Singer & Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (2017). Chapter 2: Justifications, in Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
• J.J.C. Smart (1973). An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics, in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 4: Theories of Well-Being

Resources for Theories of Well-Being:

Introduction

• Roger Crisp (2017). Well-Being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Appendix I: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Welfarism

• Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. Utilitas. 15(2): 151–174.
• Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp (1996). Welfarism in moral theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74(4): 598–613.

Hedonism

• Andrew Moore (2019). Hedonism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Ole Martin Moen (2016). An Argument for Hedonism. The Journal of Value Inquiry. 50: 267–281 (2016).
• Ivar Labukt (2012). Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure. Utilitas. 24(2): 172–199.
• Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 73(3): 619–645.
• Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Desire Theories

• Chris Heathwood (2015). Desire-fulfillment theory, in Guy Fletcher (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. London: Routledge.
• Peter Singer (2011). Chapter 1: About Ethics, in Practical Ethics (3rd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Chris Heathwood (2006). Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. Philosophical Studies. 128: 539–563.
• Mark Murphy (2002). The Simple Desire‐Fulfillment Theory. Noûs. 33(2): 247–272.
• Wlodek Rabinowicz & Jan Österberg (1996). Value Based on Preferences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism. Economics and Philosophy. 12(1): 1–27.

Objective List Theories

• Eden Lin (2014). Pluralism about Well-Being. Philosophical Perspectives. 28(1): 127–154.
• Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for an Objective List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas. 25(2): 206–220.
• James Griffin (1986). Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Chapter 5: Population Ethics

Resources for Population Ethics:

Introduction to Population Ethics

• Hilary Greaves (2017). Population Axiology. Philosophy Compass. 12(11).

General Discussions of Population Ethics

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory. PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
• Richard Yetter Chappell (2021). Section 7: Population Ethics, Parfit’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Part Four: Future Generations, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

The Total View and Repugnant Conclusion

• Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). The Repugnant Conclusion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Johan E. Gustafsson (forthcoming). Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion. In Krister Bykvist and Timothy Campbell (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Spears, D. & Budolfson, M. (2021). Repugnant conclusions. Social Choice and Welfare. 28.
• Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. Mind. 117(468): 899–933.
• Torbjörn Tännsjö (2002). Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas. 14(3): 339–359.

Variable Value Theories

• Theodore Sider (1991). Might Theory X be a theory of diminishing marginal value? Analysis. 51(4): 265–271.
• Thomas Hurka (1983). Value and Population Size. Ethics, 93(3): 496–507.

Critical Level and Critical Range Theories

• Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, & David J. Donaldson (1995). Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles. Econometrica, 63(6): 1303–1320.
• Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, & David J. Donaldson (2005). Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• John Broome (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Johan Gustafsson (2020). Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value. Economics & Philosophy, 36: 81–110.

Neutrality Intuition

• Jeff McMahan (2013). Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives. Journal of Ethics. 17: 5–35.
• Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality. Philosophical Issues. 19(1): 389–411.
• Kryster Bykvist (2007). The Benefits of Coming into Existence. Philosophical Studies. 135(3), 335–362.
• John Broome (2005). Should We Value Population?. The Journal of Political Philosophy. 13(4): 399–413.
• Elizabeth Harman (2004). Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?. Philosophical Perspectives. 18: 89–113.

Person-Affecting Views and the Asymmetry

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2009). Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?, in Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (eds.) Harming Future Persons. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine. 35. Springer, Dordrecht.
• Daniel Cohen (2019). An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry. Utilitas. 32(1): 70–89.
• Johann Frick (2014). ‘Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People’: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
• Caspar Hare (2007). Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?. Ethics, 117(3): 498–523.
• Jan Narveson (1973). Moral Problems of Population. The Monist. 57(1): 62–86.
• Josh Parsons (2002). Axiological Actualism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 80(2): 137–147.
• Melinda A. Roberts (2002). A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person-Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem. Ethics, 112(2): 315–350.

Practical Implications of Population Ethics

• Toby Ord (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
• David Althaus & Lukas Gloor (2018). Reducing Risks of Astronomical Suffering: a Neglected Priority. Center on Long-Term Risk.
• Nick Beckstead (2013). On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.

Impossibility Theorems in Population Ethics

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies. Economics and Philosophy. 16(2): 247–266.
• Philip Kitcher (2000). Parfit’s Puzzle. Noûs. 34(4): 550–577.
• Erik Carlson (1998). Mere addition and two trilemmas of population ethics. Economics and Philosophy. 14(2): 283–306.
• Yew-Kwang Ng (1989). What should we do about future generations? Impossibility of Parfit’s Theory X. Economics and Philosophy. 5(2): 235–253.

Chapter 6: Utilitarianism and Practical Ethics

Resources for Utilitarianism and Practical Ethics:

Is There a Difference Between Doing and Allowing Harm?

• Fiona Woollard & Frances Howard-Snyder (2016). Doing vs. Allowing Harm. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

The Expanding Moral Circle

• Peter Singer (1997). The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle. New Internationalist.
• Peter Singer (1981). The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cosmopolitanism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Geography

• Poverty & Our Response to It: Crash Course Philosophy #44
• Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1(2): 229–243.
• Samuel Scheffler (1999). Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism. Utilitas. 11(3): 255–276.

Anti-Speciesism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Species

• Non-Human Animals: Crash Course Philosophy #42
• Peter Singer (1975). Animal Liberation. New York: HarperCollins.
• Jeff McMahan (2002). Animals. In R. G. Frey and Christopher Wellman (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell., pp. 525–536.
• Jeff Sebo (2019). A Utilitarian Case for Animal Rights. Effective Altruism Global.

Longtermism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Time

• Hilary Greaves & William MacAskill (2019). The Case for Strong Longtermism. Global Priorities Institute.¹
• Nick Beckstead (2013). On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
• Nick Bostrom (2003). Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development. Utilitas. 15(3): 308–314.

Chapter 7: Near-Utilitarian Alternatives

Resources for Near-Utilitarian Alternatives:

Beyond Welfarism

• Richard Routley (1973). Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?. Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1: 205–210.
• Elizabeth Anderson (1999). What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109 (2): 287–337.
• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10 (3): 202–221.

Prioritarianism

• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10(3): 202–221.
• Johan E. Gustafsson (2021). Ex-Ante Prioritarianism Violates Sequential Ex‑Ante Pareto. Utilitas, 1–11.
• Joshua Greene & Jonathan Baron (2001). Intuitions about Declining Marginal Utility. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14: 243–55.

Desert-Adjusted Views

• Fred Feldman (1995). Adjusting utility for justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(3): 567–585.

Egoism and Partialism

• Simon Keller (2013). Partiality. Princeton University Press.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Part Two: Rationality and Time, Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press.
• Andreas Mogensen (2019). The only ethical argument for positive 𝛿?. forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
• Troy Jollimore (2018). Impartiality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Robert Goodin (1988). What is so special about our fellow countrymen?. Ethics 98(4): 663–686.

Beyond Consequentialism

• John Taurek (1977). Should the numbers count?. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4): 293–316.
• David Ross (1930). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
• Elizabeth Ashford (2003) The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism. Ethics 113(2): 273–302.

Chapter 8: Objections to Utilitarianism and Responses

Resources for Objections to Utilitarianism and Responses:

General

• Peter Singer & Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4: Objections.
• J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams (1973). Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Rights Objection

• Peter Singer & Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4: Objections, Section “Does utilitarianism tell us to act immorally?”
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Chapter 8: Is Utilitarianism too Permissive?
• Shelly Kagan (1998). Normative Ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chapter 3.
• Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.

The Demandingness Objection

• Brian Berkey (2016). The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium. Philosophical Studies. 173(11): 3015–3035.
• Peter Singer & Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (2014). The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press., pp. 317–336.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Chapter 7: Is Utilitarianism too Demanding?
• David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers’ Imprint. 7(8): 1–17.
• Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 13(3): 239–254.
• Susan Wolf (1982). Moral Saints. The Journal of Philosophy. 79(8): 419–434.

The Equality Objection

• Toby Ord (2015). A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism. Utilitas, 27(3): 298–302.
• Roger Crisp (2003). Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics, 113(4): 745–763.
• Larry Temkin (2003). Equality, Priority or What?. Economics and Philosophy. 19(1): 61–87.
• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio. 10(3): 202–221.
• Larry Temkin (1993). Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.

Acting on Utilitarianism

Resources for Acting on Utilitarianism

General

• Peter Singer (2011). Practical Ethics, 3rd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Peter Singer & Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (2017). Chapter 6: Utilitarianism in Action, Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Effective Altruism

• William MacAskill (2019). Effective Altruism. The Norton Introduction to Ethics, Elizabeth Harman & Alex Guerrero (eds.).²
• William MacAskill (2015). Doing Good Better: Effective Altruism and How You Can Make a Difference. New York: Penguin Random House.
• William MacAskill (2018). What Are the Most Important Moral Problems of Our Time? TED.
• Peter Singer (2013). The Why and How of Effective Altruism. TED.
• Websites and organizations relevant to effective altruism:
  • Effectivealtruism.org: This website provides online resources to learn more about effective altruism.
  • GiveWell: Charity evaluator aiming to find outstanding giving opportunities.
  • 80,000 Hours: Research non-profit aiming to help talented individuals maximize the social impact of their careers.
  • Giving What We Can: Community of people having pledged to give 10% of their lifetime earnings to effective charities.
  • Charity Entrepreneurship: Charity incubator helping start multiple high-impact charities annually.
• Podcasts on effective altruism & utilitarianism:
  • Effective Altruism: An Introduction. 80,000 Hours Podcast.
  • William MacAskill (2020). Doing Good. Making Sense Podcast with Sam Harris.
  • Peter Singer (2016). What is Moral Progress?. Making Sense Podcast with Sam Harris.
  • Gus Docker. Utilitarian Podcast.

Global Health and Development

• Toby Ord (2019). The Moral Imperative toward Cost-Effectiveness in Global Health, in Greaves, H. (ed.) Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Peter Singer (2019). The Life You Can Save, updated 10th anniversary edition. New York: Penguin Random House. (available for free download)
• Peter Unger (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Farm Animal Welfare

• Tyler John and Jeff Sebo (2020). Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals. In The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, Douglas W. Portmore (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lewis Bollard (2021). Lewis Bollard on big wins against factory farming and how they happened. 80,000 Hours Podcast with Rob Wiblin.
• Jess Whittlestone (2017). Animal Welfare. Effective Altruism.

Existential Risks

• Toby Ord (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
• Nick Bostrom (2013). Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Global Policy. 4(1): 15–31.